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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the interrelationship among attractiveness, education
and marriage market outcomes.
In Section 2, I first examine individuals attractiveness in four dimensions: an-
thropometric measures (e.g. height and BMI), physical attractiveness, personality
attractiveness and grooming, using a unique data set called Add Health. I find that
height has positive effects on men’s perceived physical attractiveness, but no signif-
icant non-zero effects on women. A higher BMI decreases an individual’s physical
attractiveness on average. However, if the square of BMI is considered, it is shown
that thinner women, and stronger men have higher ratings of physical attractiveness.
Physical attractiveness, personality attractiveness and grooming are positively cor-
related with each other. Then I studied how the four attractiveness measures affect
peoples socioeconomic outcomes simultaneously. I find that, with all dimensions of
attractiveness considered, physical attractiveness still has significant effects on in-
dividuals’ earnings and spouses’ education. Finally, I investigate the source of the
penalty and premia of grooming in the labor market. The DID model provides some
evidence that there exists general employer discrimination against bad looks.
Section 3 studies pre-marital education investment strategies developed by het-
erogeneous individuals. People with different attributes or marriage incentives form
different marriage prospects when making their college decisions, which leads to dis-
tinct investment strategies. Overall, people with lower abilities are less likely to go
to college than their high-ability cohorts. Low-ability individuals who value current
wealth and expected future earnings in a relationship (“marrying-for-money” type)
are more likely to go to college than their cohorts who prefer desirable attributes
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or matching qualities (“marrying-for-love” type). Empirically, this paper adopts
the mixture density model to capture the unobserved types of marriage incentives.
Data from National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health provides supportive
evidence. It is estimated that there are over 60 percent of people who belong to the
“marrying-for-money” type in the sample. The “marrying-for-love” type of people
have higher percentages of attending college on average.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Many studies have established the fact that a person’s attractiveness level has
effects on his socioeconomic outcomes. Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) first examined
the relationship between beauty and labor market. They found some evidence of a
positive impact of people’s physical appearances on their earnings. More specifically,
the penalty for plainness among men is about 9 percent in hourly earnings, and
the premium for beauty is about 5 percent. After this seminal work, Hamermesh
in his following papers, continually found that physical appearances have significant
impacts on various outcomes. For example, male attorney’s probability of attaining
an early partnership rises with beauty (Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998); instructors
receive higher instructional ratings if they are good looking (Hamermesh and Parker,
2005); personal beauty raises happiness (Hamermesh and Abrevaya, 2013). Other
researchers also found evidence of physical attractiveness’s significant effects on peo-
ple’s lives (Mocan and Tekin, 2006; Hitsch et al., 2010). In most of these studies,
physical attractiveness was assessed either by undergraduate students using facial
frontal photographs, by self-rating, or by interviewer rating at the end of the inter-
view.
Although many studies have shown the effects of physical attractiveness on so-
cioeconomic outcomes, few researched the transmission channels of beauty premium
and plainness penalties. There are at least four possibilities: First, an individual’s
physical attractiveness is his or her associated with anthropetric attributes, such as
height and BMI. Anthropometric attributes affect people’s socioeconomic outcomes.
A large literature has studied this relationship. Averett and Korenman (1996) found
that obese women have lower family incomes than their cohorts whose BMI is in
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the “recommended” range. Case and Paxson (2008) showed that, for both men
and women, an increase in height of four inches leads to an earnings premium of
approximately 10 percent. Second, physical attractiveness affects one’s personality
attractiveness, for example, one’s confidence level, and therefore affects the socioe-
conomic outcomes. Mobius and Rosenblat (2006) showed that physically-attractive
workers have higher levels of confidence and higher confidence increases earnings.
Third, grooming affects physical attractiveness (Hamermesh et al., 1999; Lee et al.,
2015), and grooming may also have effects on individuals’ socioeconomic outcomes.
Fourth, physical attractiveness itself affects socioeconomic outcomes. Identifying
these channels are important to the understanding of attractiveness and socioeco-
nomic outcomes. Section 2 of this dissertation use data from four waves of Add
Health. I found that, with anthropometric attributes, personality attractiveness and
grooming considered, physical attractiveness still has significant effects on individu-
als’ earnings and spouses’ education.
Then, in Section 3, I study the interrelationship between education and marriage
market outcomes. Many studies have shown that education has large effects on ones
marriage outcomes (Becker, 1973; Lefgren and McIntyre, 2006; Bruze et al., 2015).
But few research effort have looked into the interrelationship between education
and marriage in a reverse way. This gap is surprising, if individuals are indeed
forward-looking, marriage prospect should be anticipated and may potentially modify
pre-marital education decisions. Marriage incentives affect marriage prospects. For
people who value money in a relationship, their goal on the marriage market is to
find wealthy spouses or spouses with large potential earning power, and minimize
costs that may incur at the same time. Therefore they would develop education
investment strategies to maximize their utilities. Based on these facts, I argue that
individuals make college decisions with future marriages in mind. Since different
2
marriage incentives will generate different marriage prospects, thus they will result
in different education investment behaviors in early adulthood. Results in Section
3 show that Low-ability individuals who value current wealth and expected future
earnings in a relationship (“marrying-for-money” type) are more likely to go to college
than their cohorts who prefer desirable attributes or matching qualities (“marrying-
for-love” type).
Section 4 summarizes this dissertation.
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2. DECIPHERING ATTRACTIVENESS: HOW IT IS RELATED TO
ANTHROPOMETRIC AND SOCIOECONOMIC OUTCOMES
2.1 Introduction
It has long been recognized that physical attractiveness has effects on economic
behavior and socioeconomic outcomes. The related literature can be split into two
main streams. One stream studied the economic returns to beauty, and the other
researched on how anthropometric attributes, such as height, weight and body mass
index (BMI) affects socioeconomic outcomes.
The literature that studied beauty found that better-looking people earn higher
wages, have higher educated spouses, are more likely to receive first-contact emails
on dating websites than average-looking people and lead happier lives (Hamermesh
and Biddle, 1994; Hitsch et al., 2010; Hamermesh and Abrevaya, 2013). In most of
these studies, physical attractiveness was assessed either by undergraduate students
using facial frontal photographs, by self-rating, or by interviewer rating at the end
of the interview.
The work on anthropometric attributes also uncovered some interesting patterns.
Case and Paxson (2008) showed that for both men and women, an increase in height
of four inches leads to an earnings premium of approximately 10 percent. Gregory
and Ruhm (2009) examined the relationship between BMI and wages. They found
that BMI has a negative impact on earnings for women, but few consequences for
men. In the marriage market, Hitsch et al. (2010) found that women prefer tall men,
but men prefer medium sized women. For example, on the dating website, if the
height of a man is in the 6’3” - 6’4” range, then he would receive 65% more first-
contact e-mails than his cohort whose height is in the 5’7” - 5’8” range. For women,
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a tall woman with a height of 6’3” receives 42% fewer e-mails than a woman who is
5’5”.
It is clear that these two streams of literature relate to each other closely. They
studied the same question: how do physical attributes affect socioeconomic out-
comes? They both got similar answers: people who were endowed with good phys-
ical attributes, e.g. more beautiful, taller, fitter, receive premiums in the markets,
such as the labor market, dating market and marriage market. Despite the likeness,
however, the main research subjects of these two streams of literature are different.
Height and fitness only describe the shape of the body, but beauty may suggest either
a good-looking face or being well groomed. They may be positively correlated, but
they are not identical in meaning. Therefore, it is important to study the relationship
of anthropometric characteristics and beauty, and how they affect economic behavior
and socioeconomic outcomes together. The interesting question is whether anthro-
pometric characteristics affect socioeconomic outcomes through the same channel as
beauty. If so, then height and fitness is simply an approximation of beauty in those
studies. If not, then height and fitness has its own premium in the markets.
One potential problem in the studies of beauty is that when people assess some-
one’s beauty, it is difficult to solely consider his or her facial features or body fitness
without taking grooming into consideration. Even if he or she has a good-looking
face, a shabby look may still put the rater off. A recent study shows that people
wearing the luxury brand apparel receive preferential treatment over those not wear-
ing luxury brand logos (Lee et al., 2015). Especially, in their experiment, they found
that people wearing the luxury brand logo, i.e. Louis Vuitton, have higher perceived
attractiveness score (5.03) than people wearing the non-luxury brand logo (4.52),
i.e. H&M, and people wearing no logo (4.83). It is therefore reasonable to believe
that people who are well groomed would receive higher scores in the ratings of those
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studies. This, therefore, could generate a form of measurement error, lowering the
efficiency of the estimates.
Besides grooming, another attractiveness variable that also should have been
studied under this framework is personality attractiveness. There are two reasons.
First, beauty premium in the labor market is explained in two different ways by
different researchers. Some argued that sex appeal is the main reason for the beauty
premium. For example, a cosmetic saleswoman is better able to sell to customers if
she is good looking. Other researchers believe that beautiful people are more likely to
have desirable personality traits, for example high self-confidence. “It is the general
sparkle of one’s personality, not one’s beauty, that increases earnings” (Hamermesh,
2011). Therefore, studying personality attractiveness can help the understanding of
beauty premium. Second, more and more companies are giving job candidates per-
sonality tests in their hiring process. According to a testing company, the workplace
personality testing is now a 500-million-a-year business. And it is growing fastly
with a growth rate estimated to be 10 to 15 percent a year.1 However, to the best of
my knowledge, there is no paper that studies how personality attractiveness affects
people’s socioeconomic outcomes.
In this paper, I first study the interrelationship among anthropometric character-
istics, physical attractiveness, grooming and personality attractiveness. Then I in-
vestigate how these attractiveness variables affect people’s socioeconomic outcomes.
I use nationally representative data where the height and weight of each respondent
was measured during the interview process and the interviewer assesses the respon-
dent’s physical attractiveness, grooming and personality attractiveness as soon as
he finished the interview. This unique dataset enables me to answer the following
questions: First, do anthropometric characteristics explain physical attractiveness?
1http://www.wsj.com/articles/are-workplace-personality-tests-fair-1412044257
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Second, do anthropometric characteristics affect socioeconomic outcomes through
the same channel as physical attractiveness? Third, how do anthropometric char-
acteristics, physical attractiveness, grooming and personality attractiveness affect
socioeconomic outcomes simultaneously? Fourth, what are the sources of the penal-
ties and premia for attractiveness? Specifically, does there exist general employer
discrimination on people’s attractiveness?
The results suggest that both height and BMI have significant effects on a man’s
physical attractiveness, but only BMI matters for women’s physical attractiveness.
BMI does not have a significant impact on men’s earnings, but has a negative effect on
women’s earnings even after physical attractiveness is considered in the model. With
all the attractiveness variables and anthropometric measures considered, grooming
seems to be the most important factor that affects people’s socioeconomic outcomes.
However, after using instruments to solve the endogeneity issue, grooming has no sig-
nificant effects. The coefficients for the physical attractive and the physical unattrac-
tive in the full sample model are both sizable and significant, indicating that there
exists a penalty for bad looks and a premium for good looks. For men, only the
premium is significant. On spouse’s education, I find that physical attractiveness is
more important to men, while BMI is more important to women. By considering the
sorting of occupation in the model, I provide some evidence for the existence of gen-
eral employer discrimination against bad looks. Lastly, I investigate how personality
affects one’s earnings and find that an individual’s confidence level has significant
effect.
This paper is set up as follows: Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 esti-
mates whether anthropometric characteristics explain physical attractiveness using
least square regressions. Section 4 studies the interrelationship of anthropometric
measures, attractiveness and socioeconomic outcomes. Section 5 considers all the at-
7
tractiveness variables and its role in the labor market and marriage market. Section
6 studies the sources of the penalities and premia for physical attractiveness in the
labor market. Section 7 interprets the effects of personality attractiveness. Section
8 concludes the paper.
2.2 Data Description
The data I use in this paper is the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to
Adult Health (Add Health). It is a longitudinal study of adolescents in grades 7-12 in
the United States during the 1994-95 school year. Add Health studies respondents’
social, economic, psychological and physical well-being. It also has information on
respondents’ family, school, neighborhood backgrounds. Four in-home surveys were
conducted in 1994-95, 1996, 2001-02, and 2007-08.
In each survey, interviewers measured the height and weight of respondents dur-
ing the interview. Then, BMI is calculated using the BMI formula. After the in-
terview, each interviewer fills out an interviewer’s report for the respondent he just
interviewed. In the report, three questions of interest were asked: “How physically
attractive is the respondent?” “How attractive is the respondent’s personality?”
“How well groomed is the respondent?” A five-point scale for both physical at-
tractiveness and personality attractiveness was composed of the following choices:
“very unattractive”, “unattractive”, “about average”, “attractive” and “very attrac-
tive”. A five-point scale of grooming was composed of the following choices: “very
poorly groomed”, “poorly groomed”, “about average”, “well groomed” and “very
well groomed”. Add Health requires that the interviewer should complete the inter-
viewers report in a location that is not the respondent’s home as soon as he finished
the whole survey.
Two socioeconomic outcomes are considered in this paper: the log of hourly wage
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rate if the respondent has a full time job and the current spouse’s education if the
respondent is married. A set of variables are controlled in the analysis: age, gen-
der, race, a survey year dummy-variable indicators, self-reported health status and
education. I also examine the individuals standardized Peabody Picture Vocabulary
Test (PVT) score as a measure of cognitive ability. The test scores are standardized
by age and grade. Family wealth and mother’s education are also considered.
Since Add Health is a longitudinal study, each respondent has multiple values
for each variable. I use all the values that were recorded most recently (Wave IV)
for the main analysis, considering that most respondents were still adolescents in
the first three waves. However, since each respondent’s attractiveness in Wave IV
was rated by one single interviewer and different interviewers might have different
standards for attractiveness, a form of measurement error may exist and would lower
the efficiency of my estimates. Also, even though physical attractiveness can be re-
garded as an exogenous variable, a person’s environment and some socioeconomic
attributes influence his personality attractiveness and grooming. Therefore, an en-
dogeneity problem may arise if I only use Wave IV’s attractiveness variables in the
analysis. To solve these two problems, for each attractiveness variable, I use the
average of the four independent ratings in four in-home interviews as a proxy for the
true underlying attractiveness.
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample, male and female
respondents, separately. The average age of the sample is 29. Women report to be
less healthy than men, but have higher scores in physical attractiveness, personality
attractiveness and grooming. This is consistent with many studies reporting that
women are rated more attractive than men on average (Hamermesh and Biddle,
1994; Gehrsitz, 2014; Doorley and Sierminska, 2015). The anthropometric measures
of this data set are realistic and comparable to other national data (eg. IHIS).
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
full sample male female
N 15701 7349 8352
Age 29.10 29.20 29.01
(1.75) (1.76) (1.75)
Height(cm) 169.87 177.14 163.46
(10.13) (7.83) (7.17)
BMI 29.14 29.02 29.25
(7.54) (6.72) (8.20)
Physical Attractiveness 3.51 3.43 3.57
(0.56) (0.52) (0.58)
Personality Attractiveness 3.62 3.55 3.69
(0.55) (0.53) (0.56)
Grooming 3.52 3.44 3.59
(0.52) (0.50) (0.53)
General Health 3.65 3.70 3.62
(0.92) (0.91) (0.92)
Completed College 0.32 0.28 0.35
(0.46) (0.45) (0.48)
White 0.70 0.71 0.69
(0.46) (0.45) (0.46)
Currently Student 0.17 0.14 0.20
(0.37) (0.34) (0.40)
Personal Annual Income (thousands) 35.54 41.98 29.40
(38.09) (40.34) (34.73)
Hourly Wage 16.32 18.27 14.60
(19.18) (19.40) (18.81)
Married 0.49 0.45 0.53
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Number of Children 0.94 0.75 1.10
(1.16) (1.09) (1.20)
Mother High School Grad 0.82 0.84 0.82
(0.39) (0.37) (0.39)
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2.3 Do Anthropometric Characteristics Explain Physical Attractiveness?
This section investigates the predictive power of a person’s measured anthropo-
metric characteristics in explaining his interviewer-rated physical attractiveness.
Table 2.2 displays the results of a series of least square regressions of attractiveness
on anthropometric measures for men. In Column (1) and (2), the results are the
estimates corresponding to the baseline regression, which only controls for the age
and race of the respondent. If I control for interviewer fixed effects, the results are
robust. Finally, I control for a health dummy and the number of children, which
does not change the findings, as we see in Column (4). Table 2.3 reports results for
women.
Table 2.2: LS Regressions of Physical Attractiveness on Anthropometric Measures.
Men.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Height 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
BMI -0.014∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
BMI2 -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗ -0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Baseline controls? YES YES YES YES
Interviewer FE? NO NO YES YES
Additional controls? NO NO NO YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.020 0.026 0.17 0.186
N 7214 7214 7214 7200
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
It is worth noting that the signs of BMI and the square of BMI for women are
negative and positive respectively. This means that on average an increase in BMI
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Table 2.3: LS Regressions of Physical Attractiveness on Anthropometric Measures.
Women.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Height (inches) 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
BMI -0.026∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
BMI2 0.0003∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Baseline controls? YES YES YES YES
Interviewer FE? NO NO YES YES
Additional controls? NO NO NO YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.062 0.063 0.227 0.231
N 8209 8209 8209 8160
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
would decrease womens perceived physical attractiveness, but the rate of the decline
decreases as the BMI increases. However, the signs of BMI and the square of BMI for
men are completely opposite, which means that on average an increase in BMI would
increase men’s perceived physical attractiveness, but the rate of the incline decreases
as the BMI increases. This finding suggests that, in our times, people prefer women
to be thinner. But for men, higher BMIs are more welcomed, which may suggest that
people prefer men to be stronger. This finding helps to explain why some studies
found that the BMI values do not affect mens socioeconomic outcomes as much as
they affect women’s.
The other finding is that height has a significant effect on men’s physical attrac-
tiveness, but barely any effect on women’s. This may imply that body fitness is
more important to women than absolute height. And to some extent, this finding
coincides with Hitsch et al. (2010) study result that medium sized women are more
popular than tall women in the dating market.
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2.4 Physical Attractiveness, Anthropometric Measures and Socioeconomic
Outcomes
In this section, I study how physical attractiveness and anthropometric measures
affect two important outcomes in the labor market and the marriage market, namely,
hourly wages and current spousal education simultaneously.
Table 2.4: LS Regressions of Log Hourly Wage Rate on Physical Attractiveness and
Anthropometric Measures. Full Sample.
(1) (2) (3)
Height (inches) 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
BMI -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.001) (0.001)
Physical Attractiveness 0.078 ∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Education 0.123 ∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Standardized PVT score 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
N 6836 6922 6836
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The results shown in Table 2.4, Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 are a series of least square
regressions where the dependent variable is the log hourly wage rate. Regressions
in Table 2.4 use the full sample. Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 present separate analysis
for men and women. In each table, I present three specifications: First, only have
anthropometric measures (height and BMI) in the regressions. The results are pre-
sented in Column (1); Second, only have physical attractiveness in the regressions.
The results are presented in Column (2); Third, include both physical attractiveness
13
Table 2.5: LS Regressions of Log Hourly Wage Rate on Physical Attractiveness and
Anthropometric Measures. Men.
(1) (2) (3)
Height (inches) 0.006 0.007
(0.005) (0.005)
BMI 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Physical Attractiveness 0.083∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017)
Education 0.101∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Standardized PVT score 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
N 3463 3505 3463
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.6: LS Regressions of Log Hourly Wage Rate on Physical Attractiveness and
Anthropometric Measures. Women
(1) (2) (3)
Height (inches) -0.002 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006)
BMI -0.009∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Physical Attractiveness 0.078∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018)
Education 0.144∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Standardized PVT score 0.002∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
N 3373 3417 3373
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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and anthropometric measures in the regressions. The results are presented in Col-
umn (3). More specifically, the analysis only considers respondents who work full
time (the working hours per week are between 30 and 80).
Column (1) in Table 2.4 shows that BMI has a negative impact on earnings, but
height does not have a significant non-zero effect on earnings. Column (2) in Table 2.4
shows that physical attractiveness affects earnings positively. The analysis in Column
(3) in Table 2.4 considers BMI, height and physical attractiveness simultaneously.
The interesting finding is that the coefficient for BMI is not significant any more
while the coefficient for physical attractiveness is still sizable and significant. This
suggests that, for the full sample, BMI affects earnings through the same channel as
physical attractiveness, so when physical attractiveness is considered in the analysis,
the effect of BMI becomes less significant. The results in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6
show that BMI always does not have a significant impact on men’s earnings, but has
a negative effect on women’s earnings even after physical attractiveness is considered
in the model. This suggests that, for women, BMI has its own premium in the labor
market.
It needs to be pointed out that height is not significant in all the subsequent
analysis. This contradicts with the results of many previous studies. One possible
explanation is that most of those studies use samples with average ages around 40,
which is 10 years older than the sample this paper uses. Therefore it is possible that
height does not have a significant impact on early adulthood earnings.
Table 2.7, Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 present the least square regression results
where the dependent variable is the spouse’s education. Add Health did not ask the
education level of respondents’ spouses in Wave IV, but this question was asked in
Wave III. In Wave III, the age range of the sample is 18-26. Most of the respondents
were still unmarried at that time. Therefore, the number of observations is only
15
Table 2.7: LS Regressions of Spouse’s Education on Physical Attractiveness and
Anthropometric Measures. Full Sample.
(1) (2) (3)
Height (inches) 0.019 0.019
(0.019) (0.018)
BMI -0.033∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Physical Attractiveness 0.412 ∗∗∗ 0.150∗
(0.029) (0.065)
Education 0.391 ∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Standardized PVT score 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.0002) (0.002)
N 1534 1626 1534
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.8: LS Regressions of Spouse’s Education on Physical Attractiveness and
Anthropometric Measures. Men.
(1) (2) (3)
Height (inches) 0.060 0.057
(0.032) (0.033)
BMI -0.015 -0.010
(0.002) (0.002)
Physical Attractiveness 0.298∗ 0.318∗
(0.121) (0.124)
Education 0.440∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051)
Standardized PVT score 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
N 549 580 549
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.9: LS Regressions of Spouse’s Education on Physical Attractiveness and
Anthropometric Measures. Women.
(1) (2) (3)
Height (inches) -0.004 -0.003
(0.022) (0.023)
BMI -0.042∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
Physical Attractiveness 0.126 0.078
(0.071) (0.075)
Education 0.355∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.037)
Standardized PVT score 0.002∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
N 985 1046 985
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
1534 in the analysis. The results shows that both BMI and physical attractiveness
have effects on the spouses’ education for the full sample. But for men, only physical
attractiveness matters. For women, only BMI matters, which suggests that the per-
ceived physical attractiveness by an interviewer might be different with the physical
beauty perceived by a potential mate.
2.5 Physical Attractiveness, Personality Attractiveness and Grooming
In this section, I research how physical attractiveness, personality attractiveness
and grooming affect socioeconomic outcomes simultaneously. Table 2.10 presents the
correlation matrix of physical attractiveness, personality attractiveness and groom-
ing. They are all positively correlated. Physical attractiveness and personality at-
tractiveness has the highest correlation, while personality attractiveness and groom-
ing has the lowest correlation.
Now I focus on the relationship among three attractiveness measures, anthro-
17
Table 2.10: The Correlation Matrix of Physical Attractiveness, Personality Attrac-
tiveness and Grooming
physical personality grooming
attractiveness attractiveness
physical attractiveness 1.000
personality attractiveness 0.597 1.000
grooming 0.559 0.497 1.000
Table 2.11: LS Regressions of Log Hourly Wage Rate on Attractiveness and Anthro-
pometric Measures.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
full sample full sample male female
Physical Attractiveness 0.137∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.090∗ 0.071
/Attractive (0.026) (0.029) (0.040) (0.044)
Physical Attractiveness -0.115∗∗∗ -0.047 -0.035 -0.066
/Unattractive (0.026) (0.028) (0.036) (0.047)
Personality Attractiveness -0.017 -0.036 -0.017
/Attractive (0.032) (0.048) (0.044)
Personality Attractiveness -0.050 -0.065 -0.049
/Unattractive (0.030) (0.037) (0.047)
Grooming/Attractive 0.097∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.088∗
(0.028) (0.039) (0.039)
Grooming/Unattractive -0.159∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.035) (0.046)
Height (inches) 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
BMI -0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
N 6826 6826 3458 3368
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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pometric measures and hourly wage rate conditional on working full-time. Table
2.11 presents the least square results of log hourly wage rate on the three attrac-
tiveness variables and anthropometric measures. In all the subsequent analysis, I
use categories of attractiveness (unattractive, average and attractive) instead of the
real rating scores of attractiveness variables, so that the penalities and premia for
attractiveness can be easily identified.
Column (1) shows that, without considering personality attractiveness and groom-
ing, there is a significant penalty for bad looks and a significant premium for good
looks. However, after adding the two additional attractiveness variables, grooming
becomes the most important factor in the model. Both of the penality and premium
are significant.
However, these results are problematic. Although I use average rating scores for
all the attractiveness variables to avoid the endogeneity problem, the endogenous
item is actually still in the equation because an average is just a linear combination.
Personality attractiveness and grooming can be endogenous for two reasons: First,
since each individual’s personality attractiveness and grooming level was evaluated
after the whole survey, it is possible that individuals’ socioeconomic status might af-
fect interviewers’ ratings. For example, knowing that the respondent has a high wage
rate, the interviewer tends to give a high rating score to this respondent’s grooming,
because the interviewer may think that the respondent was wearing some luxury
brand cloth. This leads to a problem called “measurement error”, which can cause
endogeneity. Second, in this analysis, the research question is how attractiveness
affects one’s socioeconomic outcomes. However, an individual’s socioeconomic out-
comes can also affect his or her attractiveness, especially personality attractiveness
and grooming. This simultaneity problem is also a cause of endogeneity.
To solve this problem, I adopt interviewer fixed effects as instruments and use
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Table 2.12: LS Regressions of Log Hourly Wage Rate on Attractiveness and Anthro-
pometric measures. Interviewer FE Controlled.
(1) (2) (3)
full sample male female
Physical Attractiveness/Attractive 0.097∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.123∗∗
(0.031) (0.044) (0.046)
Physical Attractiveness/Unattractive -0.074∗∗ -0.085∗ -0.053
(0.031) (0.039) (0.051)
Personality Attractiveness/Attractive 0.012 -0.006 0.013
(0.029) (0.041) (0.045)
Personality Attractiveness/Unattractive -0.063 -0.025 0.130∗∗
(0.033) (0.041) (0.054)
Grooming/Attractive 0.044 0.032 0.049
(0.031) (0.044) (0.044)
Grooming/Unattractive -0.074∗∗ -0.029 -0.151∗∗
(0.031) (0.039) (0.052)
Height (inches) 0.005 0.009 0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
BMI -0.001 0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Interviewer FE YES YES YES
N 5371 2717 2654
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
20
the two stage least square to estimate the model. I first present LS regressions with
interviewer fixed effects controlled. Results are presented in Table 2.12 and Table
2.13. The dependent variables for Table 2.12 and Table 2.13 are log hourly wage rate
and current spouse’s education, respectively.
Table 2.13: LS Regressions of Spouse’s Education on Attractiveness and Anthropo-
metric Measures. Interviewer FE Controlled.
(1) (2) (3)
full sample male female
Physical Attractiveness/Attractive 0.032 -0.085 -0.137
(0.166) (0.325) (0.216)
Physical Attractiveness/Unattractive -0.008 -0.100 0.192
(0.178) (0.349) (0.231)
Personality Attractiveness/Attractive 0.156 -0.195 0.282
(0.163) (0.330) (0.211)
Personality Attractiveness/Unattractive 0.235 0.152 0.217
(0.194) (0.356) (0.266)
Grooming/Attractive 0.148 -0.339 0.339
(0.171) (0.372) (0.128)
Grooming/Unattractive -0.492∗∗ -0.661 -0.511∗∗
(0.183) (0.353) (0.253)
Height (inches) -0.0003 -0.018 0.031
(0.025) (0.049) (0.034)
BMI -0.026∗∗ 0.005 -0.044∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.022) (0.012)
Interviewer FE YES YES YES
N 1136 385 751
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.14 presents the results of 2SLS regressions of log hourly wage rate on
attractiveness and anthropometric measures. For the full sample, the coefficients for
physical attractiveness and physical unattractiveness are both sizable and significant,
indicating that there exists a penalty for bad looks and a premium for good looks.
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But for men, only the premium is significant. These findings are consistent with
previous literature.
Table 2.14: 2SLS Regressions of Log Hourly Wage Rate on Attractiveness and An-
thropometric Measures.
(1) (2) (3)
full sample male female
Physical Attractiveness/Attractive 0.193∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.060) (0.059)
Physical Attractiveness/Unattractive -0.124∗∗∗ -0.062 -0.142∗
(0.052) (0.056) (0.068)
Personality Attractiveness/Attractive -0.279∗ -0.369∗ -0.154
(0.125) (0.154) (0.128)
Personality Attractiveness/Unattractive -0.093 -0.140 -0.006
(0.115) (0.117) (0.143)
Grooming/Attractive 0.107 0.130 -0.075
(0.109) (0.116) (0.111)
Grooming/Unattractive 0.107 0.006 -0.104
(0.125) (0.115) (0.141)
Height (inches) 0.002 0.005 0.0005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
BMI -0.001 0.003 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 6826 3458 3368
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.15 presents the results of 2SLS regressions of current spouse’s education
on attractiveness and anthropometric measures. Most of the coefficients are not
significant. This implies that what is perceived attractive by an interviewer is dif-
ferent with what makes an individual attractive in the marriage market. The reason
might be that the interviewer may simply capture a superficial assessment, but the
real personality that matters in the marriage market can only be fully discovered in
22
one-to-one long-term relationships. However, for women, the BMI has a significant
negative impact on the spouses’ education, which suggests that thinner women have
more advantages in the marriage market.
Table 2.15: 2SLS Regressions of Current Spouse’s Education on Attractiveness and
Anthropometric Measures.
(1) (2) (3)
full sample male female
Physical Attractiveness/Attractive -0.026 0.057 -0.147
(0.188) (0.279) (0.222)
Physical Attractiveness/Unattractive -0.224 -0.337 -0.012
(0.187) (0.267) (0.232)
Personality Attractiveness/Attractive 0.342 0.244 0.394
(0.352) (0.536) (0.331)
Personality Attractiveness/Unattractive 0.254 -0.003 0.526
(0.340) (0.417) (0.372)
Grooming/Attractive 0.442 0.998∗ 0.363
(0.304) (0.409) (0.306)
Grooming/Unattractive -0.435 -0.577 -0.568
(0.301) (0.347) (0.333)
Height (inches) 0.002 -0.006 0.005
(0.021) (0.032) (0.027)
BMI -0.084∗ -0.001 -0.133∗∗
(0.042) (0.002) (0.045)
N 1216 484 732
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Most of the coefficients for personality attractiveness are not significant in the
above analysis. I will research this fact in Section 2.7.
23
2.6 The Sources of the Penalties and Premia for Physical Attractiveness in the
Labor Market
From the above analysis, it is clear that physical attractivness has sizable and sig-
nificant effects on all the three socioeconomic outcomes that this paper investigates.
The next question is what are the sources for these effects? There are two potential
answers: First, physical attractiveness may affect a worker’s productivity in a spe-
cific occupation. This may arise from factors that include the direct effect of physical
attractiveness on an individuals productivity, productivity effects on co-workers, or
from customer discrimination. A simple example is that physical attractivness is
essential to a saleperson, but not that important to a construction worker. People
who are good looking would sort themselves into occupations that reward beauty.
Second, it may result from employer discrimination against the bad looks.
To empirically distinguish these two sources, I followed Harper (2000) and adopt
the following model:
ln(ωi) = β0 + β1Xi + β2OCCi + β3gi + β4gi ∗OCCi + i
where ωi is the hourly wage rate of individual i, gi is physical attractiveness, Xi
represents a vector of productivity-enhancing attributes, OCCi is the individual’s
current occupation, β3 may be interpreted as the return to physical attractiveness
conditional on the current occupation, β4 represents the differential return to physical
attractiveness which is occupation-specifc. If β3 6= 0 and β4 = 0, it implies that there
exist general employer discrimination against the bad looks.
Add Health recorded each respondent’s occupation using the SOC code. The code
is very detailed and there are too many occupation groups. In order not to put too
many interaction terms into the regression, I use two proxies for occupations. Add
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Health asked respondents two questions related to their daily work. The first ques-
tion is, “In your current primary job, do you spend most of your time (blank)”. The
following choices were provided: “standing, doing hard physical work, for example,
doing construction work”, “standing, doing moderate physical work, for example,
nursing or being a mechanic”, “standing, doing light physical work, for example,
standing at a counter, teaching, or working at a conveyer belt” and “seated, for ex-
ample, using a computer or driving”. The second question is “Thinking about your
official job duties, which of the following statements best describes your supervisory
responsibilities at your (current/most recent) primary job?” The choices are: “I
(supervise/supervised) other employees”, “I (supervise/supervised)other employees,
some of whom (supervise/supervised) others”, “I (do/did) not supervise anyone”. I
interacted these answers with the groups of physical attractiveness and put them in
the model. The results are presented in Table 2.16. The coefficient for the unattrac-
tive group is significant and negative, while almost all the coefficients for interaction
terms are all non-significant. According to the model, this indicates that there exists
general employer discrimination against the bad looks.
2.7 Interpreting Personality Attractiveness
As it is shown above, personality attractiveness does not have significant impact
on the two socioeconomic outcomes that I investigate. In Table 2.14 Column (1)
and (2), the coefficients for attractive personality are significant but negative, which
suggests that people who are attractive in personality have lower wage rates. This
contradicts with our intuitions. Nowadays many companies ask job candidates to
take personality tests before or during interviews, researchers may expect that people
who have attractive personalities would be more likely to be hired and receive higher
wages than their unattractive cohorts. But the results of the estimation are just the
26
opposite.
One possible explanation is that personalities rated by interviewers in the survey
are different with personalities that companies would assess in the hiring processes.
Add Health does not provide a clear definition for the personality attractiveness in
their study. It is possible that survey administrators rated personalitiy attractive-
ness according to whether they like respondents’ personalites instead of assessing if
respondents’ personalities are attractive in the workplace.
According to a report written by Universum, a survey that has over 400,000
students and professionals worldwide participated shows that the five personality
traits that employers values most in 2012 are the following: professionalism (86%),
high-energy (78%), confidence (61%), self-monitoring (58%) and intellectual curios-
ity (57%). 2 Although the personality attractiveness variable may not be a good
measure for personality, Add health provides detailed personality measures by asking
respondents a series of subjective questions. For example, “Do you agree or disagree
that you feel loved and wanted?”, “You never get sad.”. And the provided choices
are: “strongly agree”, “agree”, “neither agree nor disagree disagree”, “strongly dis-
agree”. From these questions, I select out two questions that are related to workplace
personalities: “Do you agree or disagree that you have a lot of good qualities?” and
“Do you agree or disagree that you have a lot to be proud of.” These two questions
assess respondents’ confidence level, which has been proved to be an essential quality
for work. I construct the confidence variable by averaging each respondent’s answers
over the time. To avoid reverse causality, I exclude the answers in Wave IV.
Table 2.17 shows that this proxy for workplace personality has significant positive
effect on earnings.
2http://www.forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/2012/10/04/top-five-personality-traits-
employers-hire-most/
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Table 2.17: 2SLS Regressions of Log Hourly Wage Rate on Confidence Level and
Attractiveness Measures.
Confidence 0.058∗
(0.025)
Physical Attractiveness/Attractive 0.187∗∗∗
(0.048)
Physical Attractiveness/Unattractive -0.121∗
(0.052)
Personality Attractiveness/Attractive -0.257∗
(0.125)
Personality Attractiveness/Unattractive -0.081
(0.114)
Grooming/Attractive 0.097
(0.109)
Grooming/Unattractive 0.102
(0.125)
Height (inches) 0.002
(0.037)
BMI -0.002
(0.002)
N 6811
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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2.8 Conclusion
This paper studies the interrelationship among anthropometric measures, physi-
cal attractiveness, personality attractiveness, grooming and socioeconomic outcomes.
With all dimensions of attractiveness considered, I find that physical attractive-
ness still has significant effects on individuals’ earnings and spouses’ education. This
finding is consistent with previous literature. I also provide some evidence of the
existence of general employer discrimination against physically unattractive people.
There are two main limitations of this paper. First, height does not have signifi-
cant effects on socioeconomic outcomes in the results of my analysis. This contradicts
with many previous studies’ results, so it might suggest potential problems with the
data or the model. Second, the relationship between personality attractiveness and
earnings is puzzling. This may be resulted from the unclear definition of personality
attractiveness in the surveys of Add Health.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first paper that studies the inter-
relationship among physical attractiveness, personality attractiveness and grooming,
and how they affect socioeconomic outcomes together. More research is warranted.
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3. LOVE OR MONEY? HOW MARRIAGE INCENTIVES AFFECT
EDUCATION INVESTMENT DECISIONS
3.1 Introduction
Having a happy marriage is many people’s dream, but different people define
happiness differently. This paper understands that people who prefer marrying for
money value current wealth and expected future earnings, while people who prefer
marrying for love are more attracted to desirable attributes that are orthogonal
to productivity and wealth level. Assuming both of these two types of marriage
motivations exist in a population, I explore how young individuals behave when they
make education decisions conditional on their differing motivations.
Education and marriage decisions are two of the most important decisions a per-
son has to make. Many studies have established the fact that education has large
effects on one’s marriage outcomes. Becker (1973) shows that there is strong em-
pirical evidence of a positive association between education of partners. Lefgren
and McIntyre (2006) find that womens education is strongly related to husbands
income and marital status. More specifically, college completion is associated with
an increase in husbands earnings that exceeds $22,000. According to these empirical
studies, it is not hard to find that, although the primary motivation for going to
college is an increase in one’s earnings power, college also provides a potential “mar-
riage benefit” for college attendants. There are three main channels by which college
attending singles obtain gains in the marriage market. First, attending college can
increase marriage offer probabilities, since colleges provide social venues for young
people to meet. Second, people with a college education have a higher likelihood of
marrying partners with a higher education and thereby higher earnings, thus ben-
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efiting from a higher household income overall. Third, one’s education may have a
positive causal effect on a partner’s earnings, if her partner participates in the labor
force. Lefgren and McIntyre (2006) provide evidence regarding the causal impact of
education on marriage outcomes using a quarter of birth identication strategy. They
suggest that, for women whose educational attainment was affected by quarter of
birth, an extra year of schooling increases their husbands’ earnings by over $4,000.
Overall, Bruze (2009) suggests that better marital outcomes generate 35 percent of
the return to education for women by the time they reach middle age.
However, most studies in this area take one’s education decisions as given, and
look for impacts of attending college on marriage outcomes. Fewer research effort
have looked into the interrelationship between education and marriage in a reverse
way. Even less empirical research is available on this subject. This gap is surprising,
if individuals are indeed forward-looking, these conditions should be anticipated and
may potentially modify pre-marital education decisions. The issues of ex ante invest-
ments have been studied in theoretical marriage models. Burdett and Coles (2001)
examine equilibrium self-improvement and marriage proposal strategies in a two-
sided search model. Booth et al. (2007) consider two separate matching paradigms
for agents with heterogeneous abilities. On the empirical side, Ge (2011) constructs
and estimates a dynamic model where women make schooling decisions jointly with
marriage decisions. She finds that the predicted female college enrollment rate will
drop from 58.0 percent to 50.5 percent if going to college has no gains in the mar-
riage markets, which indicates that expected marriage outcomes have impacts on
education investment decisions. This paper tries to fill this gap, and shed some light
on how marriage prospect affects education choice.
More specifically, this paper only investigates the college decisions made by people
who have less cognitive abilities than the average. Cognitive abilities are the brain-
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based skills men need to carry out any task from the simplest to the most complex.
Psychology shows that cognitive abilities affect mechanisms of how people learn,
remember, and problem-solve rather than with any actual knowledge. Research
has shown that cognitive abilities have effects on school achievements and work
productivities. Christensen et al. (1975) found that ability is a strong and consistent
influence on the probability of attending college. People with higher ability are more
likely to receive more education and more likely to go to college. I discovered the
same relationship in the Add Health data. In the lowest ability group, only 13.1
percent of students went to college eventually. As ability increases, the percentage
of college attendance grows. In the highest ability group, there were over 63 percent
of students who attended college. This fact is due to two reasons. One is that
high ability students generally have better grades than their low ability cohort, and
therefore have larger chances to be admitted by colleges. Figure 2 displays the
relationship between ability and the average grade of students. The other reason
is that high ability students have less effort cost when they study, take exams and
apply to college. I define this effort cost as the amount of utilities one has to lose
in order to be accepted by a college. With the same study environment, low ability
students have to make more effort and incur larger effort costs. Since college is
expensive already, this additional effort cost will prohibit students with low abilities
from going to college. Therefore, this paper aims at understanding the role that
marriage incentives play when low abilities students make college decisions. I argue
that individuals make college decisions with future marriages on their mind. Since
different marriage incentives will generate different marriage prospects, thus they
will result in different education investment behaviors in early years.
The goals of this article are first to construct a theoretical model for two different
types of people, and second to empirically estimate the behavioral differences between
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these two types of people. I prove that, under a search framework, people with lower
abilities are less likely to go to college than their high-ability cohorts. However, low-
ability individuals who are marrying-for-money are more likely to go to college than
their marrying-for-love cohort. (For simplicity, I will use shorter terms–love-type
and money-type–to represent these two type of people.). To explain this explicitly, I
simply compare the benefits and costs of going to college for different types of people.
The benefits of attending college include high economic returns if they enter the job
market and access to the “marriage benefit” discussed earlier. The costs of college
education include tuition, fees and the “effort cost”. However, for the money type
of people, even if their abilities are lower than average, since they value current and
future wealth much more than their love-type of cohort, they are more likely to go
to college because their utility gains are still larger than costs they have to pay.
As mentioned previously, the second goal of this paper is to empirically estimate
the behavioral differences between two types of individuals. The central challenge is
the identification of the types, since they are unobservable. To solve this problem, I
adopt the mixture density model that has been used in the literature to model un-
observed heterogeneities by researchers, include Feinstein (1999); Keane and Wolpin
(1997, 2001, 2010); Gan and Mosquera (2008), etc. A model with unobserved types
have better performances and would lead to better out-of-sample predictions. What
I find is consistent with the theoretical model predictions. In addition, I find that
an individual’s attitudes toward money, relationship and spiritual life are associated
with his marriage incentive. Parental emotional supports also affect the formation
of people’s marriage incentives.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The data I use is described in
section 2 where some descriptive statistics are discussed. Section 3 gives some simple
reduced-form evidence. I then propose a theoretical model in section 4 and present
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the empirical model and estimation results in section 5. The last section concludes.
3.2 Data Description
I use data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add
Health). It consists of four separate in-home interviews of a nationally represen-
tative sample of participants who were in grades 7-12 when the study originated.
Add Health contains information on respondents social, economic, psychological and
physical well-being. It also surveys respondents’ family, school, peer groups, and
romantic relationships. The data were collected beginning in 1994, with the first
wave of the survey being conducted primarily during the 1994 - 1995 school year.
The second wave followed up with respondents approximately one year later, during
the summer of 1996. Wave III of the survey takes place in 2001 and 2002, and Wave
IV took place in 2007 and 2008.
3.2.1 Factors in College Decision
The main characteristics I used in this empirical analysis are physical attractive-
ness, ability, family total income, parental characteristics and education. Table 3.1
presents the statistics describing these variables. I examine the individuals standard-
ized Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PVT) score as a measure of cognitive ability.
The test scores are standardized by age and grade. The minimum and maximum of
the standardized PVT score in the sample is 9 and 141 respectively. Sandefura et al.
(2006) found that parental education, family income, and social capital inside and
outside the family all contribute to higher probabilities of attending college. There-
fore, I include these variabels in my analysis. In the Add Health dataset, family
wealth and mother’s education are self-reported. I use the unemployment rate in the
year when the respondent graduates from high school to capture the overall economic
environment.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
mean sd
Sex 1.543 0.498
Standardized PVT score 99.935 14.731
College 0.333 0.471
Single Parent 0.273 0.446
Mother High School Grad 0.806 0.396
Mother College Grad 0.416 0.493
Poor Health 0.046 0.210
Family Total Income (thousand) 47.111 51.412
White 0.639 0.480
African American 0.222 0.415
Asian 0.072 0.259
Public School 0.926 0.69
Unemployment Rate 4.826 0.407
N 12759
3.2.2 Factors in Marriage Incentives
The central empirical challenge of this analysis is the identification of the unob-
servable types. There is no literature on this subject. Intuitively, many factors may
affect the formation of incentives to marriage, such as family background, closeness
to parents, religion, etc. The Add Health data asks interviewees’ feelings on a broad
range of subjects. On relationships with parents, in Wave I each interviewee was
asked whether her parents were warm and loving toward her (a five-point scale),
whether she was satisfied with her relationship with her parents. On marriage/co-
habitation attitudes, each interviewee was asked whether she agrees with the state-
ment “It is all right for an unmarried couple to live together even if they aren’t
interested in considering marriage” (a five-point scale), how important it is to be
married someday (a four-point scale). On religion and spirituality, each respondent
states her present religion and was asked how important her spiritual life to her (a
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Figure 3.1: Responses of Ratings of the Importance of Having Enough Money for a
Successful Marriage or Serious Committed Relationship
four-point scale). Particularly, in Wave III of the survey, respondents are asked to
rate the importance of some elements for a successful marriage or serious committed
relationship using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means not important at all and 10
means extremely important. The elements include being of the same race or ethnic
group, love, being faithful, making a lifelong commitment and having enough money.
Not surprisingly, 86.27 percent of respondents rate love 10; 88.81 percent rate being
faithful 10; and 77.04 percent rate 10 on making a life-long commitment. Only 10.21
percent of people rate being of the same race or ethnic group as extremely important.
In all of these elements, respondents hold similar attitudes; however, when it came
to money, people’s responses varied greatly. Figure 3.1 displays the overall rate of
the importance of money in a relationship. Summary statistics of above variables
are given in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
mean sd
Mom Warm and Loving-W1 4.361 0.802
Dad-Warm and Loving-W1 4.125 0.928
Importance of Being of the Same Race or Ethnic Group-W3 3.784 3.211
Importance of Love-W3 9.657 1.152
Importance of Being Faithful-W3 9.719 1.074
Importance of Making a Lifelong Commitment-W3 9.292 1.674
Importance of Having Enough Money -W3 6.444 2.765
Okay to Live Together Without Marriage Commitment -W3 2.614 1.335
Important to Marry Someday-W3 1.709 0.856
Importance of Spiritual Life-W3 1.529 0.827
No Religion-W3 0.189 0.391
Christian-W3 0.319 0.466
Observations 12759
Figure 3.2: DID Intuition
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3.3 Some Reduced-form Evidence
This section presents some patterns in the data that suggest people with different
marriage incentives behave differently in college decisions. Since I cannot observe
each person’s marriage incentive directly, in this section, I use interviewees’ responses
to the money rating question to approximate their incentives. That is, I group
interviewees who rate the importance of money in a serious relationship from 6 to 10
as people who care about money (money-type), while interviewees who give ratings
from 1 to 5 as people who think money is not as important in a relationship (love-
type).
Figure 3.2 shows the average college rates of people with different abilities. In
Figure 3.2, there is a clear increasing trend as abilities increases for both types of
people. When ability is small, individuals who do not value money in relationships
have higher percentages that go to college. As one can see, there is an obvious gap
of college rates between two types of people. When physical attractiveness equals
to 2, the gap is as big as 8.71 percent. As physical attractiveness increases, the
differences decrease gradually. When it reaches 4, there are almost no differences
between the two types of people. However, what interesting is when ability level is
small, individuals who consider money important have higher percentages that go to
college.
To capture these effects, I use a difference-in-difference model:
Collegei = β0 +β1Typei +β2Low Abilityi +β3Typei ∗Low Abilityi +Xiγ+ui (3.1)
where Collegei = 1 if an individual obtains a bachelor degree, Typei = 1 if indi-
vidual i belongs to the money-type. I define Lowability = 1 when the individual’s
standardized PVT score is lower than 92 (that is the bottom 30.1 percent of the
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sample).
Column (1) in Table 3.3 is the estimation results of a baseline model. As expected,
parameters of ability is positive. Column (2) displays the results of the DID model.
The parameter of variable type is neither large nor significant, which indicates that
these two types of people do not vary much in college attendance rate overall. The
parameters for Typei ∗ Low Abilityi shows that, on average, low-ability money-type
individuals have 7.81 percent higher college attendance rate than the low-ability
love-type.
Table 3.3: Baseline Model & DID Model
(1) (2) (3)
Low Ability -0.144∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.018) (0.022)
Type -0.020 -0.039∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011)
Type*Low Ability 0.069∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.025)
Mother’s Education 0.039∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Single Parent -0.075∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Female 0.083∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
School FE? YES YES YES
Additional Controls? YES YES YES
Adjusted R-squared 0.206 0.207 0.222
N 9456 9456 7711
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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3.4 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I followed Booth and Coles (2010) and adopt a two-stage searching
model which is set in discrete time, with period discount factor β. In the first stage
imen and women make education choices, i.e. going to college or not. This decision
will determine their ability level in the second stage. In the second stage, all the
individuals enter the marriage market. Given an arriaval of partners, individuals
decide whether to form a match. If a match is formed, it lasts forever. If no match
is formed, then an individual searches again. Only single agents search for marriage
partners. For simplicity, it is assumed that if an agent rejects a marriage offer, then
this offer is no longer available.
Each individual is endowed with an ability a ∈ [0, a¯]. In the first stage, each
person chooses an education level e ∈ [0, e¯]. e¯ < ∞ describes a ceiling level of
education. Education here is interpreted as post-compulsory, which is not the learn-
ing of basic literacy and numeracy skills. An individual with ability a, who invests
in e education in the first stage, will have second stage productivity (ability level)
p = a + e in the workplace. Assume the cost of education is a fixed amount times
education level plus a function of ability c = c0e+g(a). Function g(a) is a decreasing
function, which captures the ”effort cost” mentioned earlier. Low-ability individuals
have higher costs to receive education than their high-ability cohorts.
In the second stage, everyone enters the marriage market looking for a spouse.
To illustrate essentials, I analyse a highly stylised marriage market and consider the
problems faced by a woman w finding a husband. Let sw denote the utility while
single. Throughout I assume the utility of being single is sufficiently small, so it is
always preferred to be in a partnership. Let Uw denote the utility she would obtain
once she get married. Marrying different men would yield different utilities. Given a
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matched pair (p, a; p′, a′), couples make joint labor supply decisions. The following is
the model from Booth and Coles (2010). They assume a competitive labor market.
If only one partner with productivity p participate the labor market, then the family
income of this couple is p. If both of them work in the workplace, the family income
would be p + p′ − x. Here x can be interpreted as the opportunity cost that would
occur if the second partner goes to work, for example, the cost of private childcare
when both parents participate in the labor market. Since x is unknown at the time
of the match, it is considered as a random draw from distribution G, where G is
a continuous distribution and has a support [0, x¯]. For simplicity, Booth and Coles
(2010) assume G is independent of (p, a; p′, a′). Therefore, their expected utility of
getting married is
U(p, p′, ω) =
∫ x¯
0
max[p, p′, p+ p′ − x]dG(x) + ω
where max[p, p′, p + p′ − x] describes their optimal labor supply choice, ω is an
idiosychratic match value.
Booth and Coles (2010) consider two polar cases of individuals’ motivation in
marriage. The first polar case assumes ω = 0 in all matches, which means there are
no idiosyncratic values in the match, and potential partners value only their expected
family income. I refer this type of people as “marrying for money”. The second case
assumes ω has two possible values. In most matches, ω = 0; but in some matches,
ω = ωH . Assuming ωH is sufficiently large that once it occurs, individuals prefer
this match than any other matches. A stable matching allocation implies individuals
accept such marriage offers and then leave the marriage market. I refer ωH as the
“love effect”. It can be interpreted in three ways: first, it can represent some desirable
attributes of the potential spouse, for example, honesty, a good sense of humor, etc.;
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second, it can be view as a good match quality, i.e. they are compatible with each
other; third, ωH can be seen as the mysterious chemistry between two people. I refer
this type of people as “marrying for love”.
Following a standard dynamic programming approach, I can convert the marital
search problem to a sequence of single period decision. In each period, an agent needs
to decide whether to accept a marriage proposal or not. If she does not accept the
proposal, she will come back to the market and continue searching in the next period.
Let attributes of women and men be xw and xm respectively. These attributes can
be considered as bundles of numerical characteristics that the person carries. Let
Vw denote a woman’s maximum expected discounted lifetime when single. It follows
that
Vw(xw) = sw + β[(1− αw)Vw + αwEwmax(Vw, U(xw, xm)
1− β )] (3.2)
where Ew is the expectation operater. The arrival rate αw is the rate at which this
woman receives offers. This sequence of decision exhibit the well-known “reservation
wage” property according to the search theory. This means that there exists some
“reservation utiliy” Uw such that a person is just indifferent between accepting a
marriage proposal and receiving the utility of getting married and continuing to
search in the next period.
The reservation utility is the unique solution to
Rw(xw) = sw +
αw
1− β
∫ Hw(xw)
Rw(xw)
(U(xw, xm)−Rw(xw))dFm(xm), (3.3)
where Fm(xm) is the distribution of men’s attributes, Hw(xw) is the highest xm that
is willing to marry woman w. A woman with an attribute xw will accept the first offer
received from a man with an attribute at least as great as Rw(xw). The argument is
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symmetric and the reservation match of a man of attribute xm is given by
Rm(xm) = sm +
αm
1− β
∫ Hm(xm)
Rm(xm)
(U(xw, xm)−Rm(xm))dGw(xw). (3.4)
Given men and women’s optimal strategies, Hw(xw) = max{xm|xw ≥ Rm(xm)}
and Hm(xm) = max{xw|xm ≥ Rw(xw)}. Area [Rw(xw), Hw(xw)] is the acceptable
area for a woman with attribute xw, which means that all the men with attribute
xm ∈ [Rw(xw), Hw(xw)] are acceptable to her.
3.4.1 Ability
In this section, I consider each person’s attributes only contain his ability level,
i.e. xm = am, xw = aw. For simplicity, I drop the subscript. In addition, I standardize
the utility of being single to be zero for all.
In the second stage, the value function for a marrying-for-money type of person
in each period is
V = α{[F (H(a))−F (R(a))]
∫ H(a)
R(a)
U(a, a′)
1− β dF (a
′)+[1−F (H(a))+F (R(a))]V }+(1−α)V
. The brace in this equation represents, with probability α, an individual meets a
potential mate. As soon as they meet, this individual discovers the ability level of
the potential mate. If the ability level is within the individuals acceptable area (with
probability F (H(a)) − F (R(a))), then they will get married. If not, the individual
will go back to the marriage market and search in the next period. The last part of
this equation represents the case when the individual does not meet anyone during
this period.
V =
∫ H(a)
R(a)
U(a, a′)
1− β dF (a
′)
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. Therefore,
∂V
∂a
=
∫ H(a)
R(a)
∂U(a, a′)
∂a
dF (a′)+U(a,H(a))f(H(a))
∂H(a)
∂a
−U(a,R(a))f(R(a))∂R(a)
∂a
For a marrying-for-love type of person,
V = α[q
∫ a¯′
a′
U(a, a′)
1− β dF (a
′) + (1− q)V ] + (1− α)V
The only difference between the money type value function and the love type value
function is that, the acceptable area for the love type person is [a′, a¯′]. This is because
by assuming large idiosyncratic match values, the matching process of the love type
person implies simple random matching.
V =
∫ a¯′
a′
U(a, a′)
1− β dF (a
′)
Therefore,
∂V
∂a
=
∫ a¯′
a′
∂U(a, a′)
∂a
dF (a′)
Proposition: When a is small,
∂V M
∂a
>
∂V L
∂a
> 0.
This proposition states that, for low-ability individuals, increasing their abilities by
going to college will increase their value. However, the increased magnitude is larger
for the money-type of person than the love-type of people, which indicates that low-
ability money-type of individuals are more likely to go to college than their love-type
cohorts.
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3.5 Empirical Models
Having established a framework where individual with different marriage incen-
tives develops different premarital investment strategies, I now investigate empirically
the link between marriage incentives and education investments.
3.5.1 Decision to Attend College
The college decision is modeled as following:
College = 1(βType0 + β
Type
1 X +  ≤ 0) (3.5)
Let X be a vector of the observable characteristics of individuals that may affect
probability of attending college. X may include one’s ability level, physical attrac-
tiveness, mother’s education, family total income, living in an urban area or not,
etc.  is the unobserved random variable, which is assumed to have a standard nor-
mal distribution. Empirically, College = 1 if a individual completes college (get a
bachelor’s degree).
In order to compare behaviors between two types of people, I specify the college
decision as following: Collegeit = β0t + β1tLow Abilityit +Xitγ + it
Coefficients β1t captures the average effect of having low ability on college deci-
sion. As suggested in the theoretical model, people with lower abilities are less likely
to go to college; but low-ability individuals who are marrying-for-money are more
likely to go to college than their love-type cohort. Therefore, the predicted signs of
β1t is negative. In addition, β1Love should be smaller than β1Money.
3.5.2 Type
I assume there are two types of people in the marriage market. In general it is
not possible to observe the type. However, it may be possible to observe a set of
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variables Z that are related to individuals’ types.
Pr(Type = Money) = Pr(Ziγ + σ ≤ 0) (3.6)
Pr(Type = Love) = 1− Pr(Type = Money) (3.7)
Z includes one’s family background, relationship attitudes, etc. This model belongs
to the family of the mixture density models which have been widely used in the
literature to model unobserved types. The identification is based on the assumption
of distribution. Here σ is assumed to follow the standard normal distribution.
3.5.3 Estimation
In this setup, the probability of going to college depends on the type of each indi-
vidual: money-type and love-type. Let Type be a random variable with a Bernoulli
distribution such that Pr(Type = Money) = p and Pr(Type = Love) = 1 − p.
When Type = Money, the conditional probability of going to college is given by
Pr(College = 1|Type = Money) = Pr(βM0 + βM1 X +  ≤ 0) (3.8)
Therefore,
Pr(College = 1) = pF (βM0 + β
M
1 X) + (1− p)F (βM0 + βM1 X) (3.9)
Since all the error terms are assumed to have normal distribution, the likelihood
function of the model is:
L =
∑n
i=1Collegeiln[Φ(Ziγ)Φ(β
M
0 + β
M
1 X) + (1− Φ(Ziγ))Φ(βL0 + βL1 X)]
+ (1− Collegei)ln[1− Φ(Ziγ)Φ(βM0 + βM1 X)− (1− Φ(Ziγ))Φ(βL0 + βL1 X)]
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Estimation Results
Estimation results are reported in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. The upper and lower
panel in Table 3.4 show the estimates for college decision of the love-type and money-
type respectfully. All the coefficients are of the desirable sign.
Table 3.4: Estimation Results of the Two-Type Model
(1) (2)
Love Type
Lowability -1.173∗ -1.29∗∗∗
(0.546) (0.320)
Mother’s Education 0.812∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.051)
Family Total Income (thousand) 0.014∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.003) (0.002)
Sex 0.465∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.193)
Money Type
Lowability -0.875∗∗∗ -0.945∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.246)
Mother’s Education 0.135∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.064)
Family Total Income (thousand) 0.0008 0.011∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.002)
Sex 0.310∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.084)
N 6812 5464
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.5 reports the type determination results. Except the importance of being
of the same race or ethnic group for a successful marriage, all the coefficients for
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Table 3.5: Estimation Results of Type Identification
Type = Love
Importance of Having Enough Money -0.135∗∗ (-3.13)
Importance of Love 0.149∗ (2.06)
Importance of Being of the Same Race or Ethnic Group 0.0476 (1.85)
Important to Marry Someday 0.710∗∗∗ (4.10)
Importance of Spiritual Life 0.247∗∗ (2.67)
Okay to Live Together Without Marriage Commitment -0.252∗∗∗ (-3.40)
Dad Warm and Loving 0.381∗∗∗ (3.49)
Constant -4.612∗∗∗ (-4.31)
N 5526
standard error in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
other variables are significant. The results suggest that people who think having
enough money is important for a successful marriage are more likely to be the type of
marrying for money; people who think love is important are more likely to marry for
love. If a person considers marrying someday important, or if he considers spiritual
life important, he is more likely to be a love-type. The more someone agrees with the
statement, “It is all right for an unmarried couple to live together even if they aren’t
interested in considering marriage,” the more likely he is to be a marrying-for-money
type of person. If one’s father was loving and warming when he was young, he is
more likely to be a marrying-for-love type of person.
3.6.2 Descriptive Comparisons
Based on the estimation results of type identification, I present several descriptive
comparisons between the two type of people. Among the 5,526 respondents (sample
size for the estimation of the mixture density model), 62.79 percent belong to the
marrying-for-money type and 37.21 percent belong to the marrying-for-love type.
This composition does not vary much among different race groups (White: 61.55
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percent, 38.45 percent respectively; African American: 62.42 percent, 37.58 percent
respectively; Asian: 70.50 percent, 29.50 percent respectively). For the money-type
of people, 26.60 percent went to college, while 47.20 percent of the love-type went
to college. By Wave IV of the survey (2008), the sample was aged 25-34, and 52.21
percent have got married. I define people who get married before 25 as marrying
early, then 15.85 percent of the money-type of people and 25.57 percent of the love-
type of people married early.
In Wave IV, the survey asked married respondents about their feelings of their
marriages. Each respondent rated how much he loved his spouse (a four-point scale),
in general how happy he is in his relationship with his spouse (a three-point scale)
and how committed he is to his relationship with his spouse (a four-point scale).
For the money-type of people, 79.24 percent of respondents claimed to love their
spouses a lot, 66.31 percent were very happy to be with their spouses and 63.68
percent claimed to be completely committed to their partners. For the love-type of
individuals, 87.29 percent of respondents said they loved their spouses a lot, 77.61
percent were very happy to be with their spouses and 75.71 percent claimed to be
completely committed to their partners. These two sets of statistics corroborate
that people with different marriage incentives have different marriage utilities. It
also suggests that there exists a trade-off relationship between “love” and money in
marriage. Results are presented in Table 3.6.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper first presented a theoretical model to understand people’s searching
behavior in the marriage market. Under two different motivations (“marrying for
money” and “marrying for love”), individuals have different marriage prospects and
thus develop distinct education investment strategies. A low-ability marrying-for-
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money type of person is more likely to go to college than his marrying-for-love cohort.
Empirical support for these conclusions was found in the data. Using the mixture
density model, the estimation results give strong evidences of the existence of two
types of people. An individual’s attitudes toward money, relationship and spiritual
life are associated with his marriage incentive. Parental emotional supports also
affect the formation of people’s marriage incentives.
These results provide interesting insights into the determinants of educational de-
cisions. When individuals are making educational decisions, labor market prospects
are not the only element taken into account. People are forward-looking, and there-
fore form expectations of the “marriage benefit” of college and develop investment
strategies according to their marriage incentives. Assuming different incentives al-
lows individuals to have different forms of utilities, which makes the economic theory
more adaptable and closer to the reality.
The results of this paper also suggest that a careful analysis of how marriage
incentives may affect the process of pre-marital decisions as well as post-marital out-
comes would enhance our understanding of the household, for example, labor partici-
pation. While there is a large body of literature studying females work decisions, little
is known about how marriage incentives jointly affect women’s pre-marital education
decisions and post-marital work decisions. For instance, a low-ability marrying-for-
money type of woman may choose to go to college in order to marry someone who
has large earnings power, and then decide to stay at home after getting married be-
cause she may not be competitive in the job market. If we ignore the whole behavior
strategy, we would probably attribute the woman’s work decision to her husband’s
earnings power and miss the real point. More research is warranted.
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4. SUMMARIES
Attractiveness, especially physical attractiveness, has always been an intriguing
subject in economics research. Studies have shown that people who are more physi-
cally attractive generally do better in education, labor market and marriage market.
However, the meaning of physical attraciveness itself has not been fully explored in
the research. High physical attractiveness could mean either a fit body, a desirable
height or a good looking face. Due to the measurement error in surveys, physical
attractiveness may also be affected by respondents’ grooming levels and personali-
ties. If researchers do not take all these factors into consideration, they cannot fully
understand how physical attractiveness affects one’s socioeconomic outcomes. In
Section 2 of this dissertation, I use a data called Add Health to study this problem.
Add Health asked interviewers to measure each responden’s height and weight. It
also asked interviewers to rate each respondent’s physical attractiveness, grooming
level and personality attractiveness. I showed that with all dimensions of attrac-
tiveness considered, physical attractiveness still has significant effects on individuals’
earnings and spouses’ education. I also provide some evidence of the existence of
general employer discrimination against physically unattractive people. Personality
attractiveness does not have significant impact on individuals’ earnings. One possi-
ble explanation is that personalities rated by interviewers in the Add Health surveys
are different with personalities that companies would assess in the hiring processes.
Therefore, I construct a proxy for workplace personality. The result shows that this
proxy has ignificant positive effect on earnings.
After invesgating how attractiveness affects both labor market and marriage mar-
ket. I then look at the interrelationship between labor market and marriage market.
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Education and marriage decisions are two of the most important decisions a per- son
has to make. Many studies have established the fact that education has large effects
on ones marriage outcomes. However, most studies in this area take ones education
decisions as given, and look for impacts of attending college on marriage outcomes.
Few research effort have studied how marriage prospects would impact one’s educa-
tion investment decision. In Section 3, I investigate pre-marital education investment
strategies developed by individuals with different marriage incentives. Results show
that people with lower abilities are less likely to go to college than their high-ability
cohorts. Low-ability individuals who value current wealth and expected future earn-
ings in a relationship (“marrying-for-money” type) are more likely to go to college
than their cohorts who prefer desirable attributes or matching qualities (“marrying-
for-love” type) in their future marriages.
In sum, this dissertation studies the interrelationship among attractiveness, labor
market and marriage market outcomes. There are some limitations of this dissera-
tion. First, in the study of the relationship between attractiveness and socioeconomic
outcomes, height does not have significant effects on socioeconomic outcomes in the
results of my analysis, which contradicts with many previous studies’ results. Sec-
ond, in Section 3, besides the “marrying-for-money” type and the “marrying-for-love”
type, a neutral type may be introduced in the model and may change the results.
More research is warranted.
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